Barbarossa
The soviet - german conflict 1941-45
The largest and war in history
RICHARD OVERY
A titanic and inhuman struggle
DAVID M. GLANTZ - JONATHAN HOUSE
No battle in history can compare
ALAN CLARK
RICHARD OVERY
A titanic and inhuman struggle
DAVID M. GLANTZ - JONATHAN HOUSE
No battle in history can compare
ALAN CLARK
Barbarossa: The Blitzkrieg Strike on the USSR
On December 18,1940 Adolf Hitler approved Directive № 21, more commonly known as the Barbarossa Plan. His intention was to defeat the USSR in a single swift operation.
The troops were instructed to strike deep into the Russian defenses, to deploy armored units and to destroy the Red Army forces preventing their retreat inland. The final objective of the operation was to be the attainment of a line sealing off Asiatic Russia and running, in general, the Volga-Arkhangelsk. From there the Nazis were planning to immobilize the last remaining Soviet industrial bases using air power.
Three army groups were appointed to carry out the strike: Army Group North to attack Leningrad, Army Group Center to march through to Moscow - whose seizure was considered a critical military and political objective - and Army Group South to take Ukraine. Army Group South was separated from the other two by the impassible Pripet Marshes, and at the early stage of the operation it was to act in isolation. Each army group supported by its own designated air support fleet.
The German command planned it as an unremitting operation, scheduled to be completed in three to four months.
Preparations for the strike on the USSR were complete by June 1941.
The troops were instructed to strike deep into the Russian defenses, to deploy armored units and to destroy the Red Army forces preventing their retreat inland. The final objective of the operation was to be the attainment of a line sealing off Asiatic Russia and running, in general, the Volga-Arkhangelsk. From there the Nazis were planning to immobilize the last remaining Soviet industrial bases using air power.
Three army groups were appointed to carry out the strike: Army Group North to attack Leningrad, Army Group Center to march through to Moscow - whose seizure was considered a critical military and political objective - and Army Group South to take Ukraine. Army Group South was separated from the other two by the impassible Pripet Marshes, and at the early stage of the operation it was to act in isolation. Each army group supported by its own designated air support fleet.
The German command planned it as an unremitting operation, scheduled to be completed in three to four months.
Preparations for the strike on the USSR were complete by June 1941.
Germany Declares War on USSR
Late at night on June 21,1941 Vladimir Dekanozov, the USSR Ambassador to Germany, was urgently summoned to the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At 3:00 a.m. Berlin time on June 22,1941, he was presented a Memorandum of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the USSR Government. An identical Memorandum was handed simultaneously, at 5 a.m. Moscow time, to the USSR People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov by the German Ambassador Von der Schulenburg.
The Soviet Union was accused of subversive activity and undermining Germany and Europe; adopting a hostile foreign policy towards Germany; and concentrating all its forces in readiness at the German border, in violation of all treaties between the two countries.
The Memorandum informed the Soviet government that the Government of
Germany can no longer remain impassive to the serious threat from its Eastern border, and stated that The Fuhrer has therefore ordered the German Armed Forces to oppose this threat with all means at their disposal.
Military action on Soviet territory had already started almost an hour earlier.
The Soviet Union was accused of subversive activity and undermining Germany and Europe; adopting a hostile foreign policy towards Germany; and concentrating all its forces in readiness at the German border, in violation of all treaties between the two countries.
The Memorandum informed the Soviet government that the Government of
Germany can no longer remain impassive to the serious threat from its Eastern border, and stated that The Fuhrer has therefore ordered the German Armed Forces to oppose this threat with all means at their disposal.
Military action on Soviet territory had already started almost an hour earlier.
22 June 1941 - Brest Fortress Defense
The Brest fortress, with 7,000 - 8,000 inhabitants, was subjected to heavy aerial bombing and artillery shelling. Its defenders were caught offguard. Many of them were killed or wounded straight away. Nevertheless, the Germans faced fierce resistance.
The 45th infantry division, at full strength, made an assault on the fortress. Although it was planned that the entire operation was to take just several hours, violent fighting went on for almost a month. By the morning of June 22, in spite of the German fire, approximately half of the fortress garrison managed to escape. The rest of the troops were blockaded and continued to ward off enemy attacks. The very^ next day, the 45 1 Division sustained such losses that the German command was forced to feed reserve troops into the attack. The fortress, which by now had been reduced to warehouses and barracks with no further military importance, was besieged by units which were to have been advancing deep into Soviet territory. The fortress defenders were short of weapons, ammunition, water and medical supplies.
Late in July, German troops succeeded in gaining control over the territory and capturing its last defenders. However, some sources maintain that desultory fighting continued there until November 1941. The details of this heroic defense became known only in the 1950’s.
Battles for Control of the Skies
In the morning of June 22, Luftwaffe bombers struck the Soviet airfields along the border strip. The plan was to keep Soviet airplanes grounded, and to have ground troops left without air cover. The aerial bombing continued throughout the day. Although some bombers were intercepted by Soviet fighters, by the evening most of the airfields had been incapacitated.
The Soviet air forces desperately tried to defend their bases, cover the ground troops on their march toward the borders, and contain the German offensive, all at the same time. This dire situation prompted some crews to sacrifice themselves: 15 ram attacks (aircraft to aircraft) were once carried out on a single day.
However, such heroic efforts alone could not prevent the inevitable catastrophe. Organizational flaws in the Red Army air forces and inadequate radio communications were the primary reasons why the German air forces had little trouble accomplishing their combat mission.
By the night of June 22 the Soviet air forces had lost about 2,000 aircraft while the German forces lost only about 70. The Luftwaffe secured temporary air superiority but failed to completely destroy the Red Army’s air force.
The Soviet air forces desperately tried to defend their bases, cover the ground troops on their march toward the borders, and contain the German offensive, all at the same time. This dire situation prompted some crews to sacrifice themselves: 15 ram attacks (aircraft to aircraft) were once carried out on a single day.
However, such heroic efforts alone could not prevent the inevitable catastrophe. Organizational flaws in the Red Army air forces and inadequate radio communications were the primary reasons why the German air forces had little trouble accomplishing their combat mission.
By the night of June 22 the Soviet air forces had lost about 2,000 aircraft while the German forces lost only about 70. The Luftwaffe secured temporary air superiority but failed to completely destroy the Red Army’s air force.
Military Crisis Management
The sudden start of the war caused a crisis on a scale that could not was not anticipated. The existing Soviet civil and military bureaucratic system could not respond quickly enough to the drastic changes in the situation. The country needed special wartime crisis management authorities.
On June 23,1941, the High Command Headquarters was established, with People’s Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko at its head. It soon became clear that the drastic situational changes in the vast front line called for prompt response from Command, but Timoshenko lacked management experience to control multiple agencies. On July 10, Stalin became the chairman of the High Command Headquarters which was at the same time transformed into the Supreme Command Headquarters and on August 8, 1941, into the Supreme High Command Headquarters.
On June 30, the State Defense Committee was established. This was a crisis
super-government, whose decisions and orders were to be obeyed without question by all government authorities, organizations and citizens of the USSR. The State Defense Committee was also chaired personally by Stalin.
Headquarters officials at the front line, and State Defense Committee personnel at rear-echelon support supervised the execution of orders, were personally responsible fortheir execution, and had virtually unlimited powers.
Evacuation
Before the war, about 40% of the country’s population, producing a third of its goods, lived in the territories that became the primary theater of war. As far back as 1920’s the government began making plans for the evacuation of industry eastward. By 1941 administrators and managers on all levels had all necessary instructions and could commence the evacuation of organizations under their command with no additional orders.
The main burden of the evacuation fell on the railways - 300,000 cars were loaded with evacuated cargo. In July, railway traffic over the westerly routes was so dense that the trains followed each other at braking distance only, appearing as one continuous strand. If the evacuation weren’t enough, the railway officials had to organize a counterflow of replenishments to the front.
The German command worked persistently to destroy the USSR’s transportation system. Between June and December of 1941, the Germans dropped 46,000 aerial bombs on Soviet railways. Extraordinary measures were taken to minimize the consequences of these air strikes.
By November, 1523 factories and organizations and 10,000,000 people had been evacuated eastward. By mid-1942, the industrial complex, having been successfully rescued from the enemy, began supplying the front with products..
The main burden of the evacuation fell on the railways - 300,000 cars were loaded with evacuated cargo. In July, railway traffic over the westerly routes was so dense that the trains followed each other at braking distance only, appearing as one continuous strand. If the evacuation weren’t enough, the railway officials had to organize a counterflow of replenishments to the front.
The German command worked persistently to destroy the USSR’s transportation system. Between June and December of 1941, the Germans dropped 46,000 aerial bombs on Soviet railways. Extraordinary measures were taken to minimize the consequences of these air strikes.
By November, 1523 factories and organizations and 10,000,000 people had been evacuated eastward. By mid-1942, the industrial complex, having been successfully rescued from the enemy, began supplying the front with products..
German offensive at Center of Front halted
In mid-July, Hitler had to halt the offensive on the central route of the Eastern Front.
In just one month of the war, the German army sustained three times as many losses on the Eastern Front as it had in the entire French campaign. The Wehrmacht army encountered serious obstacles on its march: en route to Leningrad, Army Group North was deferred at the Luga defensive belt; on the Kiev route, Army Group South was also forced to halt, having encountered a series of powerful counterassaults. Consequently, further offensive on Moscow, in Hitler’s view, could stretch the front line and subject Army Group Center to severe flank attacks from the Northern and Southern Groups of the Soviet Army.
Under the circumstances, the Fuhrer decided it was important to first seize Leningrad (partly because it symbolized the Bolshevik Revolution) and the
Donbass coal basin. In the meantime, the German troops en route to Moscow would regroup, receive reinforcements and wait for the front lines to straighten. To reinforce the northern and southern route defenses, Army Group Center began movement of shock tank troops.
The German command did not anticipate Hitler’s decisions, and they had to revise their plans in a hurry. The first signs of a serious conflict between Hitler and his generals began to show, and later these turned into a severe crisis.
In just one month of the war, the German army sustained three times as many losses on the Eastern Front as it had in the entire French campaign. The Wehrmacht army encountered serious obstacles on its march: en route to Leningrad, Army Group North was deferred at the Luga defensive belt; on the Kiev route, Army Group South was also forced to halt, having encountered a series of powerful counterassaults. Consequently, further offensive on Moscow, in Hitler’s view, could stretch the front line and subject Army Group Center to severe flank attacks from the Northern and Southern Groups of the Soviet Army.
Under the circumstances, the Fuhrer decided it was important to first seize Leningrad (partly because it symbolized the Bolshevik Revolution) and the
Donbass coal basin. In the meantime, the German troops en route to Moscow would regroup, receive reinforcements and wait for the front lines to straighten. To reinforce the northern and southern route defenses, Army Group Center began movement of shock tank troops.
The German command did not anticipate Hitler’s decisions, and they had to revise their plans in a hurry. The first signs of a serious conflict between Hitler and his generals began to show, and later these turned into a severe crisis.
The Siege of Leningrad begins
On September 8, the Germans reached the south shore of Lake Ladoga. Finnish troops were advancing on the city at the same time. The very next day, the German advance units were already fighting in the suburbs of Leningrad. Marshall Voroshilov, commander of the Leningrad Front, and Leningrad party leaders were dose to panicking, and gave frantic orders, such as to arm the Leningrad workers with lances (sarcastically nick-named Voroshilov’s lances) and switchblades. When Voroshilov gave orders to prepare to scuttle thè Baltic fleet, Stalin replaced him with Army General Zhukov.
The new commander immediately banned all preparations for Leningradi capitulation, ordered troops redeployed from the Karelian Isthmus and, with thè help of the navy, a dense protettive artillery barrage on all routes that posed a threat. Zhukov announced to the commanders on all levels that they would be held personally responsible for any retreat from their assigned positions with violators subject to being shot. As a result of these measures, thè German offensive was slowed, and on September 18,1941 the front was stabilized.
Having failed to take Leningrad, Hitler’s command decided to break the city’s resistance with a lengthy blockade, regular shelling from siege howitzers and aerial bombing. A document from Hitler’s HO dated September 29,1941, reads: The Fuhrer has decided to wipe Leningrad off the face of the earth. Upon Russia’s defeat there remains no reason for the existence of this large city.
Although the Nazi propaganda hailed the siege of Leningrad as a great victory, in truth this was a bluff: the Barbarossa Pian had failed on the northern part of the Eastern Front.
The new commander immediately banned all preparations for Leningradi capitulation, ordered troops redeployed from the Karelian Isthmus and, with thè help of the navy, a dense protettive artillery barrage on all routes that posed a threat. Zhukov announced to the commanders on all levels that they would be held personally responsible for any retreat from their assigned positions with violators subject to being shot. As a result of these measures, thè German offensive was slowed, and on September 18,1941 the front was stabilized.
Having failed to take Leningrad, Hitler’s command decided to break the city’s resistance with a lengthy blockade, regular shelling from siege howitzers and aerial bombing. A document from Hitler’s HO dated September 29,1941, reads: The Fuhrer has decided to wipe Leningrad off the face of the earth. Upon Russia’s defeat there remains no reason for the existence of this large city.
Although the Nazi propaganda hailed the siege of Leningrad as a great victory, in truth this was a bluff: the Barbarossa Pian had failed on the northern part of the Eastern Front.
Situation at the close of September 1941
By the end of the third month of the war on the USSR, the Barbarossa Plan was facing failure. Wehrmacht casualties exceeded the most pessimistic forecasts. The Leningrad offensive was halted. The siege of the city diverted sizable forces. In the south, the Germans succeeded in surrounding a vast group of Soviet troops, but failed to smash the Soviet defenses completely. On the main Moscow route, the summer offensive was bogged down. The German army had to regroup.
The Soviet command learned valuable lessons from its defeats, and urgently reorganized its units and forces to adapt them to the realities of the war. In the country’s eastern regions the evacuated industry was picking up steam. The citizenry of the frontline cities aided the army in building strong lines of defense.
Although the German command could no longer maintain their offensive on the entire front, they still had an opportunity to finish the war before the winter frosts. This would require that they quickly conquer Moscow, the capital of the USSR.
The Soviet command learned valuable lessons from its defeats, and urgently reorganized its units and forces to adapt them to the realities of the war. In the country’s eastern regions the evacuated industry was picking up steam. The citizenry of the frontline cities aided the army in building strong lines of defense.
Although the German command could no longer maintain their offensive on the entire front, they still had an opportunity to finish the war before the winter frosts. This would require that they quickly conquer Moscow, the capital of the USSR.
The Defense of Moscow
The Soviet capital played a special role in Hitler’s military plans - he believed that the seizure of Moscow would cause immediate collapse of the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht blitzkrieg during the first months of war had allowed Hitler to begin the decisive offensive on Moscow - the operation code-named Typhoon - in early September. By mid-October, when the German troops were nearly at the capital’s doorstep, the city administration declared a state of high alert. The streets were barricaded, buildings and basements were refitted as firing-points, and the People’s Militia was once again called into service.
The Red Army, in their objective to halt the enemy’s tanks at any expense, continuously counterassaulted the enemy; but by mid-November Army Group Center had once again taken the offensive. Shortly afterward, the Germans captured the city of Klin, as well as Solnechnogorsk and Krasnaya Polyana; German officers could already make out the buildings of Moscow through their binoculars. On November 29, several German tanks reached the 23-kilometer mark on the Leningrad Highway, but were stopped by fire from antiaircraft batteries. The enemy was exhausted. The final assault on Moscow was beaten back.
The defense of Moscow had endured from September 30 until December 5,1941. During this time the Soviet command managed to redeploy fresh troops from the Far East to the Central Region, and to prepare a powerful counterassault that finally succeeded in defeating the enemy on the very doorstep of the USSR capital.
The Red Army, in their objective to halt the enemy’s tanks at any expense, continuously counterassaulted the enemy; but by mid-November Army Group Center had once again taken the offensive. Shortly afterward, the Germans captured the city of Klin, as well as Solnechnogorsk and Krasnaya Polyana; German officers could already make out the buildings of Moscow through their binoculars. On November 29, several German tanks reached the 23-kilometer mark on the Leningrad Highway, but were stopped by fire from antiaircraft batteries. The enemy was exhausted. The final assault on Moscow was beaten back.
The defense of Moscow had endured from September 30 until December 5,1941. During this time the Soviet command managed to redeploy fresh troops from the Far East to the Central Region, and to prepare a powerful counterassault that finally succeeded in defeating the enemy on the very doorstep of the USSR capital.
Results of the Summer-Autumn Campaign of 1941
By early December 1941, the German army was on the doorstep of the USSR capital. The now-occupied territories had been home to nearly 40% of the country’s population. Millions of people found themselves under German control. Having occupied Ukraine - the country’s granary - as well as the most part of Donetsk coal basin the enemy deprived the country of vast supplies of raw materials and food.
Nevertheless, Hitler and his generals had little cause for celebration -Leningrad, scheduled to have been seized by late summer, was still putting up a defense and diverting the resources of an entire army group, and the German advance on the Moscow route had been halted. On the southern parts of the Eastern Front the Red Army had successfully counterassaulted the enemy near Rostov-On-Don. The Barbarossa Plan had failed completely, and the Germans, having lost nearly a million soldiers in five months, faced the prospect of a protracted war for which they had not been ready.
The Red Army command had successfully averted disaster. A forced retreat had not escalated into mass flight, and the German advance had been frustrated by ceaseless counterassaults. The USSR's leaders had succeeded in swift eastward evacuation of the country’s most important industrial facilities, which by now were already producing; many rear-area facilities had been adapted to wartime needs. In spite of the threat of war with Japan, fresh divisions were redeployed from the Far East to the front By early December 1941, the Red Army command had concentrated powerful army groups near Moscow and was prepared to deliver the enemy a retaliatory strike.
Nevertheless, Hitler and his generals had little cause for celebration -Leningrad, scheduled to have been seized by late summer, was still putting up a defense and diverting the resources of an entire army group, and the German advance on the Moscow route had been halted. On the southern parts of the Eastern Front the Red Army had successfully counterassaulted the enemy near Rostov-On-Don. The Barbarossa Plan had failed completely, and the Germans, having lost nearly a million soldiers in five months, faced the prospect of a protracted war for which they had not been ready.
The Red Army command had successfully averted disaster. A forced retreat had not escalated into mass flight, and the German advance had been frustrated by ceaseless counterassaults. The USSR's leaders had succeeded in swift eastward evacuation of the country’s most important industrial facilities, which by now were already producing; many rear-area facilities had been adapted to wartime needs. In spite of the threat of war with Japan, fresh divisions were redeployed from the Far East to the front By early December 1941, the Red Army command had concentrated powerful army groups near Moscow and was prepared to deliver the enemy a retaliatory strike.
The siege of Sevastopol (October 1941 - July 1942)
Axis ground forces reached the Crimea in the fall of 1941 and overran most of the area. The only target not in Axis hands was Sevastopol. Several attempts were made to secure the city in October and November 1941. A major attack was planned for late November, but heavy rains delayed it until December 17, 1941. Under the command of Erich von Manstein, the Axis forces were unable to capture Sevastopol during this first operation. Soviet forces launched an amphibious landing on the Crimean peninsula at Kerch in December 1941 to break the siege and force the Axis to divert forces to defend their captured positions. The operation saved Sevastopol momentarily, but the bridgehead in eastern Crimea was eliminated in May 1942.
After the failure of the first assault on Sevastopol, the Axis chose to wage siege warfare until mid-1942, at which point they attacked the encircled Soviet forces by land, sea, and air. On 2 June 1942, the Axis began this operation, codenamed Störfang. The Soviet Red Army and Black Sea Fleet held out for weeks under intense Axis bombardment. The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) played a vital role in the siege, its 8th Air Corps bombing the beleaguered Soviet forces with impunity, flying 23,751 sorties and dropping 20,528 tons of bombs in June alone. The intensity of the German air attacks was far beyond previous offensive German bombing attacks against cities such as Warsaw, Rotterdam or London. By the end of the siege, only 11 undamaged buildings remained in Sevastopol. The Luftwaffe prevented or deterred most Soviet attempts to evacuate their troops by sea. The German 11th Army suppressed and destroyed the defenders by firing 46,750 tons of artillery shells on them during Operation Störfang.
Finally, on July 4, 1942, the remaining Soviet forces surrendered and the Germans took over the port. The Soviet Separate Coastal Army was annihilated, with 118,000 men killed, wounded or captured in the final assault and 200,481 casualties in the siege as a whole for both it and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Axis losses at Störfang amount to 35,866 men, including 27,412 Germans and 8,454 Romanians. With the Soviet forces neutralized, the Axis returned its attention to that year's major summer campaign, "Case Blue" and the advance on the Caucasus oil fields.
After the failure of the first assault on Sevastopol, the Axis chose to wage siege warfare until mid-1942, at which point they attacked the encircled Soviet forces by land, sea, and air. On 2 June 1942, the Axis began this operation, codenamed Störfang. The Soviet Red Army and Black Sea Fleet held out for weeks under intense Axis bombardment. The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) played a vital role in the siege, its 8th Air Corps bombing the beleaguered Soviet forces with impunity, flying 23,751 sorties and dropping 20,528 tons of bombs in June alone. The intensity of the German air attacks was far beyond previous offensive German bombing attacks against cities such as Warsaw, Rotterdam or London. By the end of the siege, only 11 undamaged buildings remained in Sevastopol. The Luftwaffe prevented or deterred most Soviet attempts to evacuate their troops by sea. The German 11th Army suppressed and destroyed the defenders by firing 46,750 tons of artillery shells on them during Operation Störfang.
Finally, on July 4, 1942, the remaining Soviet forces surrendered and the Germans took over the port. The Soviet Separate Coastal Army was annihilated, with 118,000 men killed, wounded or captured in the final assault and 200,481 casualties in the siege as a whole for both it and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Axis losses at Störfang amount to 35,866 men, including 27,412 Germans and 8,454 Romanians. With the Soviet forces neutralized, the Axis returned its attention to that year's major summer campaign, "Case Blue" and the advance on the Caucasus oil fields.
The siege of Leningrad
In mid-September 1941, the German command decided against further attempts to seize Leningrad and determined instead to keep the city under siege, wearing out the city’s defenders with deprivation, artillery bombardments, and aerial bombings. The encirclement was not completely closed - the Germans could not totally cut off the city supply route via Lake Ladoga. Nevertheless, in the winter of 1941-1942, 2,000-3,000 people a day died of starvation.
From the very beginning of the siege, the Red Army tried constantly to breach the enemy’s lines, and although none of these attempts succeeded, the Soviet troops’ vigor forced the Germans to maintain a significant force around the city and even to redeploy reinforcements from other parts of the front. The siege of Leningrad was slowly becoming a burden beyond the Wehrmacht’s capacity.
In summer 1942, the Army Group North began preparations for the decisive assault on the city, but this plan was disrupted by a Red Army offensive. In January 1943, during operation Iskra [Spark], the Soviet troops managed to punch a ground corridor to Leningrad a few kilometers wide, but the siege was not completely lifted until a year later, on January 27,1944.
From the very beginning of the siege, the Red Army tried constantly to breach the enemy’s lines, and although none of these attempts succeeded, the Soviet troops’ vigor forced the Germans to maintain a significant force around the city and even to redeploy reinforcements from other parts of the front. The siege of Leningrad was slowly becoming a burden beyond the Wehrmacht’s capacity.
In summer 1942, the Army Group North began preparations for the decisive assault on the city, but this plan was disrupted by a Red Army offensive. In January 1943, during operation Iskra [Spark], the Soviet troops managed to punch a ground corridor to Leningrad a few kilometers wide, but the siege was not completely lifted until a year later, on January 27,1944.
Starvation in besieged Leningrad
When Leningrad was cut off from the rest of the country, all available provisions have been taken stock of. It became apparent that even with the most frugal distribution, supplies would last no longer than several weeks. Leningrad’s only supply route was via Lake Ladoga, but there weren’t enough barges, and no equipped ports at all, so water supply of provisions was not possible. To economize on flour, various flour substitutes were added to the bread. But supplies continued to deplete quickly.
Throughout the fall of 1941 the rations were regularly cut, and on November 20,1941, rations reached the absolute minimum: blue-collar workers received 250 grams of surrogate bread per day, while children and dependents received only 125 grams. By then the residents already started to die of starvation, and these rations could only postpone the inevitable death by starvation, but not prevent it.
By the middle of December, Leningrad was an atrocious site - electricity, water supply and sewer services were cut off, and the city suffered unremitting artillery shelling. The residents, debilitated by starvation, were dying everywhere - right on the streets, in their houses, in bread lines and in the factories. At every city cemetery enormous pits were dug to bury the victims in common graves.
The Road of Life - a supply route over the frozen Lake Ladoga - slowly improved the situation, and by mid-February the rations got noticeably more substantial. Nevertheless, many of the city’s starved residents were debilitated beyond rescue. Isolated starvation-related deaths were registered as late as the end of 1942. Even official records indicate that during the siege of Leningrad at least 700,000 people perished from starvation and its aftereffects.
Moscow: the Soviet counteroffensive
Although the Wehrmacht offensive had been halted, German intelligence estimated that the Soviet forces were out of reserves and therefore would not be able to mount a counter-offensive. This estimate turned out to be incorrect, as Zhukov transferred over 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East. The Red Army had amassed a reserve of 58 divisions by early December, when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin. Even with these new reserves, the Soviet forces engaged in the operation numbered only 1,100,000 men, thus only slightly outnumbering the Wehrmacht. However, with careful deployment of troops, a ratio of two to one was achieved at critical points.
On December 5, 1941, a counteroffensive began on the Kalinin Front to "eliminate the immediate threat to Moscow." The South-Western Front and Western Front began their offensives the next day. After several days of little progress, the Soviet armies retook Solnechnogorsk on 12 December and Klin on 15 December. Guderian's army "beat a hasty retreat to Venev" and then Sukhinichi. "The menace hanging over Tula has been removed."
On December 8, Hitler had signed his directive No. 39, ordering the Wehrmacht to assume a defensive position on the entire front. German troops were unable to mount a solid defense in their current positions and were forced to retreat to consolidate their lines. Guderian wrote that discussions with Hans The Soviet winter counter-offensive in Moscow
Although the Wehrmacht offensive had been halted, German intelligence estimated that the Soviet forces were out of reserves and therefore would not be able to mount a counter-offensive. This estimate turned out to be incorrect, as Zhukov transferred over 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East. The Red Army had amassed a reserve of 58 divisions by early December, when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin. Even with these new reserves, the Soviet forces engaged in the operation numbered only 1,100,000 men, thus only slightly outnumbering the Wehrmacht. However, with careful deployment of troops, a ratio of two to one was achieved at critical points.
On December 5, 1941, a counteroffensive began on the Kalinin Front to "eliminate the immediate threat to Moscow." The South-Western Front and Western Front began their offensives the next day. After several days of little progress, the Soviet armies retook Solnechnogorsk on 12 December and, after fierce fighting, Klin on 15 December.
Kalinin was recaptured at the end of the month. To the south, the encirclement of Tula was broken and the German forces were pushed back more than a hundred miles to the city of Kaluga, which was retaken in a week of fierce house-to-house fighting: both sides were under orders not to give up one palm and to fight to the death. As the German grip broke, the Soviet forces became more secure. The fighting had largely taken place under an icy gale, which had decimated both sides. Hardened as the Red Army soldiers were, the battle in the dead of winter was not easy for either side.
Army Group Centre, which was facing the Soviet attack, was in turn threatened with encirclement. German commanders began urging Hitler to authorize retreat to more defensible positions. Like Stalin, Hitler would not permit any general retreat. Instead, he dismissed the highest-ranking commanders and on December 19 assumed command of the army himself, promising that he would "educate him in National Socialism." Hitler and Stalin were now facing each other directly: two amateur commanders at the head of the largest armed forces ever mobilized for war.
On 13 December, the Muscovite population received the news that the threat of a German encirclement of the capital had been averted. In reality the battle continued well into January: despite the terrible weather and the shortage of reinforcements and vehicles, the German troops and commanders fought with tenacity and skill. The situation at the front was far from clear: German units found themselves surrounded and could only be supplied by air; Soviet units, infiltrated beyond the German lines, found themselves surrounded. Zhukov wanted to concentrate the remaining reserves for a second phase of the offensive, to push back the powerful German formations still in front of Moscow and to straighten the line of Soviet front. Stalin had different ideas. The sight of the fleeing enemy was enough to fuel dreams of an even greater victory. Once the two major cities were saved, Stalin wanted to drive the enemy back all along the front, before spring rains and German reinforcements slowed the Soviet advance.
These were absolutely impossible dreams. The Red Army was exhausted and overstretched and failed.
Results of the Red Army’s winter counterassault
By mid-spring 1942 the German army had been pushed westward on all fronts. On some routes the Wehrmacht was forced to retreat as far as 400 kilometers. Tensions between Hitler and his generals evolved into a major confrontation: on December 19, the Fhrer dismissed Army Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, and took personal command of the Wehrmacht. The high brass, humiliated by this upstart former lance corporal, harbored enmity against Hitler. In turn, the Fuhrer completely stopped trusting his career generals - from now on he personally made all strategic decisions.
During the winter battles, the German army barely avoided disaster. Since the beginning of the war the Wehrmacht lost over 400,000 soldiers. It was unthinkable to try to pursue the offensive on the entire front within the next few months - to seal the gaps opened by the Red Army assaults, fresh divisions had to be redeployed to the east from France and Denmark. Hitler realized that a two-front war was inevitable, but he believed the most important 1942 target was to capture the oilfields of the Northern Caucasus, to provide the Wehrmacht with a sustainable fuel supply.
The Soviet command, heartened by its winter successes, tried to expand the counterassault and drove its troops forward. They planned that 1942 would be the year of a final victory over Germany, but in truth there were few reasons for optimism. By spring, the momentum of the Red Army’s assault proved insufficient to break the newly reinforced German defense.
Expecting that the main German attack once again would be directed at the capital of USSR, Stalin ordered maximum forces concentrated around Moscow. Unfortunately, Stalin’s expectations proved wrong and resulted in a series of harsh defeats for the Red Army.
During the winter battles, the German army barely avoided disaster. Since the beginning of the war the Wehrmacht lost over 400,000 soldiers. It was unthinkable to try to pursue the offensive on the entire front within the next few months - to seal the gaps opened by the Red Army assaults, fresh divisions had to be redeployed to the east from France and Denmark. Hitler realized that a two-front war was inevitable, but he believed the most important 1942 target was to capture the oilfields of the Northern Caucasus, to provide the Wehrmacht with a sustainable fuel supply.
The Soviet command, heartened by its winter successes, tried to expand the counterassault and drove its troops forward. They planned that 1942 would be the year of a final victory over Germany, but in truth there were few reasons for optimism. By spring, the momentum of the Red Army’s assault proved insufficient to break the newly reinforced German defense.
Expecting that the main German attack once again would be directed at the capital of USSR, Stalin ordered maximum forces concentrated around Moscow. Unfortunately, Stalin’s expectations proved wrong and resulted in a series of harsh defeats for the Red Army.
The Crimean Front disaster
On January 20, 1942 Stalin dispatched a General HQ representative to the Crimea. The emissary was Lev Mekhlis, a Deputy Defense Commissar, who enjoyed Stalin’s complete trust and was ordered to strengthen the front command Just two days after his arrival at Kerch, Mekhlis reported to Stalin that he believed the organization of the troop command was utterly unsatisfactory.
Within the first several days Stalin’s emissary made the Crimean front autonomous and significantly reshuffled the command. At his order, many fresh divisions were redeployed to the Crimea, and the supply of weapons, tanks and ammunition was increased significantly. Having no good knowledge of military science but armed with his fervent belief in the success of the upcoming offensive, Mekhlis considered any preparations for the enemy’s counterattack politically harmful Instead of building a few lines of defense, he stretched all three front armies into one narrow line along the advance positions, so that all 10,000-soldier divisions, as well as all the transportation and storage were crowded into a narrow defensive position just 2 km deep.
On May 8,1942, the Germans subjected the Crimea front troops to heavy bombing and artillery shelling, and, having breached the weak defensive line, advanced on Kerch. The Crimea front collapsed within a matter of several days. The Soviet forces, having sustained heavy casualties, retreated to the east and crossed over to the Taman Peninsula - pell-mell, leaving behind their equipment and property. People crossed the Kerch Straits in barrels or on logs, or just swam. About 150,000 people were killed, captured or missing.
The crushing defeat of the Crimea front became one of the most infamous episodes of the Great Patriotic War; it resulted in swift collapse of Sevastopol and the loss of the Crimea.